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ESTATE FREEZES AFTER THE REVENUE ACT OF 1987
by
RONALD D. AUCUTT*t
Last December, while tax professionals were still grappling with the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986,' Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1987.2 Some Christmas
present!
One of the most significant casualties of the 1987 Act was the popular plan-
ning tool known as the estate "freeze." I For decedents' estates originating after
December 31, 1987, any "freeze" completed after December 17, 1987 will be
covered by the new law There is no transition rule for transactions in progress.
Traditionally, estate freezing frequently could satisfy several planning ob-
jectives with one stroke. These objectives would commonly include: (1) minimiz-
ing estate taxes by shifting accretion in value of a client's business interests; (2)
providing for income to a client at retirement, and post mortem to the client's sur-
viving spouse; (3) avoiding probate administration on the transfer of certain assets;
and (4) fixing a "lifetime" value for those assets which would otherwise pose prob-
lems for estate tax purposes.
The particular nature of each client's business interest, when coupled with
the complexion of the tax code, would dictate the choice to be made among various
freezing techniques. Historically, perhaps the most popular technique has been
the recapitalization of a closely-held (i.e., close) corporation. The corporate
recapitalization 5 typically involved an exchange by the older client of common
stock for preferred stock, and the sale or gifting of common stock to the client's
children or younger associates. The value of the business was captured in the
preferred stock, but any future appreciation of the business inured to the trans-
ferred common stock. Thus, there resulted not only a determination of the fair
market value of the client's interest in the business, but also a valuation which
remained fixed or "frozen" in the client's estate. In effect, the appreciation in the
* Member of Miller & Chevalier, Chartered, Washington, D.C., and immediate past chair of the Committee
on Estate and Gift Taxes, Section of Taxation, American Bar Association. He was a member of the Thsk Force
on Transfer Tax Restructuring, Section of Taxation of the American Bar Association. The Isk Force presented
a report to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Tax Policy of the United States Treasury Department in
the Spring of 1987. That report is reprinted in full elsewhere in this volume of the Akron Tax Journal.
tDue to publication delays, this article does not reflect the impact of the July and August, 1988 Technical
Corrections Bills.
IPub. L. No. 99-514, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986).
2 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Titles IX and X, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987).
'Section 10402 of the 1987 Act added a new § 2036(c) to the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) of 1986, and
redesignated former IRC § 2036(c) as IRC § 2036(d).
4 IRC § 2036(c)(1)(B); H.R. Rep. No. 100-495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 997 (1987) (Conference Report).
5 Dean v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 19 (1948), acq. 1949-1 C.B. 1: Hartzell v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 492 (1939),
acq. 1939-2 C.B. 16.
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value of the business from the date of the freeze to the date of the older client's
death simply escaped the wealth transfer tax .6 Moreover, control of the business
could be preserved through designating the client's shares as voting preferred and
reissuing the common shares as nonvoting.
Similarly, for the business structured as a partnership, the elder-generation
client became a limited partner while the younger-generation client continued as
a general partner. The limited partner's capital account remained frozen in value,
and the general partner's capital account was credited with the venture's growth.7
Another, more aggressive partnership freeze involved disproportionate alloca-
tions of profits, losses, or cash flow to reduce the elder generation's share, perhaps
even to zero. This aggressive technique, however, was not possible if the younger
generation's interest resulted from a gift and capital was not a material income-
producing factor,' and in any event is much more difficult under the new I.R.C.
Section 704(b) regulations. 9
Some other techniques have been employed alone or in combination with a
corporate recapitalization or partnership freeze to satisfy clients' needs. Familiar
examples include buy-sell agreements, 0 certain stock restrictions and options,
using "S" corporations as partners, I installment sales, loans coupled with pur-
chases, private annuities, charitable lead trusts, sales of remainder interests, 2 and
grantor retained income trusts (GRITs). Another approach has been joint pur-
chases. In one application of this technique, the elder generation purchased a life
estate or a term of years and the younger generation purchased the remainder.
Another application was for a marital trust to buy the life estate and the credit
shelter trust to buy the remainder.
Policy Arguments
Criticism of estate freezes has centered on the fact that these techniques
operate essentially as testamentary substitutes. Such a "loophole" in the estate
tax provisions would be especially subject to manipulation where the transferor
and transferee of the property were within the same family. In effect, while pur-
porting to transfer a part of the interest in the business to a younger generation,
the elder generation continues to enjoy the fruits of the business - much as in
a classic retained life estate.
Moreover, any "business" arrangement between family members, including
6 Estate of Boykin v. Commissioner, 53 TCM (CCH) 345 (1987).
7This technique was recognized in substantial part in Estate of Meyer v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 311 (1972),
nonacq. 1975-1 C.B. 3, affd per curiam, 503 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1974).
8 1.R.C. § 704(e).
9 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b).
'
0But see Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h); Dorn v. United States, 828 F.2d 177 (3d Cir. 1987).
11See Letter Ruling 8804015. But cf Rev. Rul. 77-220, 1977-1 C.B. 263.
12But see Gradow v. United States, 11 CI. Ct 808 (1987).
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an alleged sale for fair value, is necessarily suspect. Although, since 1977, gift
tax valuation errors can be corrected in the computation of the estate tax,' 3 this
correction only determines the starting point of the graduated estate tax rates, and
therefore it has only a limited effect, and no effect at all in the case of very large
gifts.
The government simply finds it increasingly difficult to police valuation
abuses whether in the form of non-arm's-length deals or in the form of non-arm's-
length conduct subsequent to deals.' 4 This was particularly true during the late
1970's and early 1980's when interest rates, and thus appropriate rates of return
on preferred interests received in a freeze transaction, were at unprecedented high
levels. There was therefore great pressure to augment a less-than-market rate of
return with "bells and whistles" such as conversion rights, powers to liquidate,
or other rights not intended to ever be exercised and possibly even vanishing at
death.
Other policy considerations are raised in defense of these freeze techniques,
however. Primarily, it is appropriate as a matter of policy to assist - not penalize
- small businesses, which contribute greatly to the economy. Small businesses
should be able to defend themselves against a 55% estate tax. Moreover, a per-
son should be able to give away an asset, such as a share of stock, as a completed
transaction. Penalties and other deterrents to abuse are far more sensible measures
than the broad sweep of a generalized legislative ban.
In a related vein, it is appropriate for parents to give children the incentive
of an equity interest and to encourage risk-taking incrementally, while the parents
can still prevent or correct excesses. And it is especially appropriate to shift the
growth to children at a time when that growth more and more is attributable to
the efforts of the children. Further, appreciation can never be guaranteed; often
values decline. Both the possibility of appreciation and the risk of loss are reflected
in fair market value determinations. In a value-for-value exchange, the anticipated
income from the frozen interest is economically equivalent to the potential ap-
preciation in the growth interest. Indeed, in a perfectly efficient economy, there
is no such thing as a "freeze," and in an imperfect economy a "freeze" is only
one form of "gamble" that pays off. It is not appropriate as a matter of policy to
create new hindrances to entrepreneurship.
THE NEW LAW
Section 2036(C):
Inclusion Related to Valuation Freezes.
1. In General. - For purposes of subsection (a), if -
A. any person holds a substantial interest in an enterprise, and
13 1.R.C. § 2001(b)(1)(B); Technical Advice Memorandum 8447005.
14See Rev. Rul. 83-120, 1983-2 C.B. 170.
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B. Such person in effect transfers after December 17, 1987, property hav-
ing a disproportionately large share of the potential appreciation in
such person's interest in the enterprise while retaining a dispropor-
tionately large share in the income of, or rights in, the enterprise,
then the retention of the retained interest shall be considered to be a reten-
tion of the enjoyment of the transferred property.
2. Special Rule for Sales to Family Members. - The exception contained
in subsection (a) for a bona fide sale shall not apply to a transfer described
in paragraph (1) if such transfer is to a member of the transferor's family.
3. Definitions. - For purposes of this subsection -
A. Substantial Interest - A person holds a substantial interest in an enter-
prise if such person owns (directly or indirectly) 10% or more of the
voting power or income stream, or both, in such enterprise. For pur-
poses of the preceding sentence, an individual shall be treated as own-
ing any interest in an enterprise which is owned (directly or indirectly)
by any member of such individual's family.
B. Family. - The term "family" means, with respect to any individual,
such individual's spouse, any lineal descendant of such individual or
of such individual's spouse, any parent or grandparent of such in-
dividual, and any spouse of any of the foregoing. For purposes of the
preceding sentence, a relationship by legal adoption shall be treated
as a relationship by blood.
C. Treatment of Spouse. - An individual and such individual's spouse
shall be treated as one person.
4. Coordination with Section 2035. - For purposes of applying Section
2035, any transfer of the retained interest referred to in paragraph (1) shall
be treated as a transfer of an interest in the transferred property referred
to in paragraph (1).
5. Coordination with Section 2043. - In lieu of applying Section 2043, ap-
propriate adjustments shall be made for the value of the retained interest.
GENERAL OPERATION OF IRC SECTION 2036(c)
The "bottom line" result of I.R.C. Section 2036(c) is a deemed "retention
of the enjoyment of the transferred property." 15 To the extent that a growth in-
terest in an enterprise is transferred while a frozen interest is retained, the transfer
is "caught" by I.R.C. Section 2036(c) and "brought back into" the transferor's
gross estate, at the transferred interest's then value.' 6
15I.R.C. § 2036(c)(1).
16 1.R.C. § 2036(c) applies even in the case of annual exclusion gifts of $10,000 or less per donee.
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Examples:
1. H (husband) owns all the stock - common and preferred - of a corpora-
tion. He gives 60% of the common stock to D (daughter) and retains the
preferred stock. The value of the common stock at the date of H's death
is included in his gross estate.
2. If, instead, H gives D 20% of the common stock and 20% of the preferred
stock, Section 2036(c) does not apply.
3. If, instead, H gives D 80% of the common stock and 20% of the preferred
stock (a combination of Examples 1 and 2), 60% of the common stock is
included in his gross estate.1 7
The breadth of I.R.C. Section 2036(c) is staggering. Although the above ex-
amples deal with corporate recapitalizations, comparable results would occur not
only with partnership interests but also with any other interests in an enterprise.
Moreover, it is immaterial that the donees in the above examples are members
of the donor's family, because no language in the provision limits the range of
transferees. Conceivably, therefore, a gift to charity would be within the ambit
of Section 2036(c).18 Also a matter of consternation is the extent to which, as in
these examples, Section 2036(c) impacts not only on H's estate but also on W's
(Wife's). In example 3 above, for instance, the provision as enacted apparently
includes the gift of common stock in W's estate also,' 9 a result that is not rationally
within the scope of Section 2036(c).
SPECIAL RULES
First, for the new provision to apply, Section 2036(c)(1)(A) and (3)(A)
establish a threshold test whereby the transferor and transferor's family must
together own (directly or indirectly) at least 10% of the voting power or income
stream of the enterprise.
Examples:
1. Wife (W) owns 1% of the voting common stock and 2% of the nonvoting
preferred stock of a corporation. No one else in the family has any interest
in the corporation. Wgives the common stock to S (son). Section 2036(c)
does not apply.
2. Wowns 1% of the voting common stock and 2% of the nonvoting preferred
stock of a corporation. D owns 12% of the voting common stock. Wgives
her common stock to S. The common stock is included in W's estate.
Second, Section 2036(c)(2) differentiates family members from all other
classes of potential transferees. This provision causes the same result where either
17 Conference Report, supra note 4, at 996.
18 Even if there were an offsetting charitable deduction for estate taxation, there would be uncertainty for the
donor where the charity sells the stock before the donor's death. See infra text accompanying note 34.
191.R.C. § 2036(c)(3)(C).
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a gift or a sale is effected to a family member.2 °
The definition of "family'" given by Section 2036(c)(3)(B), is utilized for at-
tribution as well as transferee purposes. Essentially, the definition encompasses
the individual's spouse, their respective lineal relatives (from grandparents on
down), and those relatives' spouses. Although adopted descendants are includ-
ed, collaterals (most notably, brothers and sisters) are not included. Hence, the
individual's parents-in-law qualify as family members but the individual's uncle
or nephew does not.
Further, Section 2036(c)(3)(C) states that "An individual and such in-
dividual's spouse shall be treated as one person." For example, H gives common
stock to S and D and preferred stock to W, retaining nothing for himself. The com-
mon stock is includible in H's gross estate because, with H and Wdeemed as one
person, H has effectively retained the preferred stock.21
Third, the new law alters the treatment of consideration as between family
and non-family transferees.22 Although I.R.C. Section 2036(c) treats the transferor
as having retained enjoyment of the transferred property, it is I.R.C. Section
2036(a) that actually includes the value of the property in the transferor's gross
estate.23 The general rule is that I.R.C. Section 2036(a) does not apply to "a bona
fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth." For
example, W sells common stock to N (niece or nephew) for full consideration in
cash, retaining preferred stock. The common stock is not included in W's gross
estate. However, a different result obtains under I.R.C. Section 2036(c)(2), which
removes the "bona fide sale" exception in intrafamily transfers. Hence, if W sells
the common stock to S (instead of N) for full consideration in cash and retains
the preferred stock, then the common stock is included in W's gross estate. For
this purpose, corporate recapitalizations and other value-for-value exchanges are
sales for consideration, even if the party involved is the entity, rather than other
family members.
Moreover, IRC Section 2043(a) does not apply, according to IRC Section
2036(c)(5) 24 Instead, "appropriate adjustments shall be made for the value of the
retained interest." This paragraph was intended to at least provide the result that
20For any non-family transferee, § 2036(a) excepts a bona fide sale from the clutches of § 2036(c). See the
discussion infra text accompanying note 24, regarding treatment of consideration.
21 Likewise, the common stock is apparently includible in W's estate. But if this latter result is correct, then
H's estate should receive a marital deduction for the stock he gave to S and D! A technical correction is ob-
viously needed here.
Note however that the example in the text is only a special case. The application of I.R.C. § 2036(c)(3)(C)
is not so limited. Using the basic example where H gives common stock to D and retains preferred stock,
the common stock is again apparently included in W's estate as well as in H's. Such a result is obviously too
broad.
22 See supra text accompanying note 20.
23 See Appendix B, proposed § 2036(c)(4).
14Without amendment, § 2043 would not apply in this example anyway, because full consideration had been
paid.
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Section 2043(a) would have provided, allowing an offset for the consideration
received.25 As enacted, however, Section 2036(c)(5) is indecipherable without
a technical correction. Nevertheless, an argument can be advanced that Section
2036(c)(5) should be expanded to allow compounding of the consideration to the
date of transferor's death. This approach is correct if Congress's objective is to
reconstruct the result that would have occurred had the sale not been made at all
and the transferor had simply held the growth interest until death.26
Fourth, IRC Section 2036(c)(4), as originally drafted, provides for coordina-
tion with IRC Section 2035, the "three-year rule." In general, where the client
retains the preferred shares until his death, his Federal gross estate will include
the date-of-death value of both the preferred shares and those common shares
transferred during his lifetime. 7 But where the retained interest is transferred
within three years before death, the growth interest is still brought back into the
gross estate.
For example: Wowns all the stock, common and preferred, of a corporation.
W gives the common stock to D on February 1, 1988, and the preferred stock to
S on January 1, 1993. If Wdies January 2, 1996, or later, then none of the stock
is included in her gross estate. If, however, Wdies, say, November 1, 1995, then
the common stock - and possibly also the preferred stock - is included in her
gross estate.
Section 204(o) of the pending technical corrections bill, H.R. 4333 and S.
2238, would dramatically amend I.R.C. Section 2036(c)(4) 2 8 If this "technical
correction" is enacted, then, in a situation covered by Section 2036(c), if dur-
ing the original transferor's lifetime, either the transferee retransfers the transferred
property outside of the family or the original transferor transfers the retained in-
terest, within or outside the family, there would in effect be an acceleration of the
tax. In other words, the amount that would have been included in the original
transferor's gross estate under Section 2036(c) if the transferor had died at that
time would be treated as a current gift by the transferor,29 and Section 2036(c)
would no longer apply to that transferred property for estate tax purposes when
the original transferor dies.30 If less than all of the transferred interest is retrans-
ferred or less than all of the retained interest is transferred, then this acceleration
would be effected with respect to that portion.
25 Conference Report, supra note 4, at 996-97.
26 Note the identical results in Appendix A for Examples D (a Section 2036(c) sale, assuming compounding)
and F (no transfer at all).
27 IRC § 2036(c)(4) and 2035(d)(2). According to the Conference Report, supra note 4, at 995-96:
The value of the transferred property is includible in a decendent's gross estate, if the decedent retained
the interest for his life, for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death, or for any period
which does not in fact end with his death. *** The provision only makes certain property includible
in the estate; it does not affect the valuation of such property for estate tax purposes.
21 See Appendix B.
29 Proposed I.R.C. § 2036(c)(4)(A).
30 Proposed I.R.C. § 2036(c)(4)(B).
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For example (the same example as immediately above): W owns all the stock,
common and preferred, of a corporation. W gives the common stock to D on
February 1, 1988, and the preferred stock to S on January 1, 1993. Under the
technical correction, W would be treated as having made a gift of the common
stock, as well as the preferred stock, on January 1, 1993. Likewise, if D gave the
common stock to charity on January 1, 1992, or sold the common stock to an out-
sider on January 1, 1992, W would be treated as having made a gift of the com-
mon stock on January 1, 1992. In either case (a transfer by Wor a retransfer out-
side W's family by D), nothing would be included in W's gross estate by reason
of Section 2036(c), even if W did not survive for three years.
The apparent purpose of the proposed amendment is to provide a gift tax
analogue to the estate tax result of Section 2036(c), so as to prevent avoidance
of the consequences of Section 2036(c) by subsequent transfers. Without such an
amendment, it would be possible, for example, for a 40-year-old client to "freeze"
an interest in an enterprise by transferring a growth interest, such as common
stock, to children, and then transfer the "frozen" interest to children at age 65.
Under the statute as originally drafted, if the parent survived another three years,
25 years of appreciation would effectively escape transfer tax. The proposed new
Section 2036(c)(4) would tax that appreciation at the time of the second gift.
This amendment would answer some of the questions that were raised im-
mediately after enactment of Section 2036(c), such as the consequences if follow-
ing an estate freeze the entire enterprise were sold to outsiders.3' But on balance
the proposed amendment has still caused great consternation, and at the very least
needs considerable refinement. The amendment would simply treat the original
transferor as having made a gift equal to the amount that would hypothetically
be included at that time in the transferor's gross estate. But Section 2502(a) 32
which provides for the computation of the gift tax, does not contain a coordinating
rule analogous to the last sentence of Section 2001(b),33 which provides for com-
3 1 This amendment, however, would not answer all the questions presented by subsequent transfers. See in-
fra note 51.
32 1.R.C. § 2502(A):
(a) Computation of tax. - The tax imposed by section 2501 for each calendar year shall be an amount
equal to the excess of -(1) a tentative tax, computed under section 2001(c), on the aggregate sum of the taxable gifts for
such calendar year and for each of the preceding calendar periods, over
(2) a tentative tax, computed under such section, on the aggregate sum of the taxable gifts for each
of the preceding calendar periods.
331.R.C. § 2001(A):
(b) Computation of tax. - The tax imposed by this section shall be the amount equal to the excess
(if any) of --
(1) a tentative tax computed under subsection (c) on the sum of -
(A) the amount of the taxable estate, and
(B) the amount of the adjusted taxable gifts, over
(2) the aggregate amount of tax which would have been payable under chapter 12 with respect to
gifts made by the decedent after December 31, 1976, if the provisions of subsection (c) (as in
effect at the decedent's death) had been applicable at the time of such gifts.
For purposes of paragraph (1)(B), the term "adjusted taxable gifts" means the total amount of the taxable gifts
(within the meaning of section 2503) made by the decedent after December 31, 1976, other than gifts which
are includible in the gross estate of the decedent.
[Vol. 5
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putation of the estate tax, to prevent a double gift tax on serial transfers. Under
the proposed amendment, if common stock is given to children in one year and
preferred stock given the following year, the common stock will be subject to a
double gift tax, even if it does not appreciate in value at all.
In addition, the proposed new Section 2036(c)(4) does not specify to whom
the deemed gift is considered made. The donee of this deemed gift could be im-
portant in determining the applicability of the annual gift tax exclusion,3 4 the
charitable deduction," or the generation-skipping transfer tax.3 6
This amendment would apparently permit the statute to have a cascading ef-
fect. Example: H and S each own preferred stock of a corporation. H owns all
the common stock. H gives the common stock to S. S subsequently gives the
common stock to his child, GC. The common stock apparently is included in the
estates of both H and S when they die, because of their retention of preferred stock.
If GC transfers the common stock outside of the family, it appears that both H
and S would be deemed to have made a give.
The description accompanying the technical corrections bill, prepared by the
staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, included the following illustration:
[A] person who holds all the stock in a corporation and gives away the com-
mon stock while retaining all of two classes of preferred stock would be
treated as making a gift under the provision only to the extent that he subse-
quently transfers a proportionate amount of each class of preferred stock.
If he subsequently transfers 25% of one class and 75% of the other class of
preferred stock, he would under the provision be treated as making a gift with
respect to only the 25% of the common stock with respect to which propor-
tionality was restored. His estate would still include 75% of the common stock
- the share for which disproportionate ownership continues to exist after
the subsequent transfer.3 7
The requirement that "proportionality" be "restored" as to all classes of preferred
stock considered separately will inevitably produce the wrong result. In the ex-
ample stated, if it is assumed that each share of preferred stock has any value at
all, then clearly the transferor has retained less than 75% of all the preferred stock.
It would make more sense to combine the two classes of preferred stock for this
purpose. For example, if the two classes were the same size, then 50% of the com-
mon stock in the stated example should be removed from the scope of Section
2036(c).38
34 Section 2503(b).
35 Section 2522.
36Section 2601 et. seq.
37 Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, Description of the Technical Corrections Act of 1988 (H. R. 4333
and S. 2238, 425 (March 31, 1988).
38 Like the rest of § 2036(c), the proposed new § 2036(c)(4) would raise many qeustions about its scope. For
example, even payments on an installment sale note would arguably be partial dispositions of the transferor-
seller's retained interest, creating tremendous complexity.
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The proposed technical correction would also direct the Service to "prescribe
such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes
of this subsection [i.e., Section 2036(c)], including such regulations as may be
necessary or appropriate to prevent avoidance of the purposes of this subsection
through distributions or otherwise." 39 This appears intended to prevent the tech-
nique of diluting the value of an enterprise through distributions to younger-
generation owners.40
Example: H owns all the common and preferred stock of a corporation. In
1988 H gives all the common stock to S and D. By 1995, the common stock
has greatly increased in value. If income tax rates in 1995 are still lower than
estate tax rates, even the payment of dividends to S and D with respect to their
common stock would put more money in the hands of S and D, after taxes,
because it would dilute the value of the common stock and save estate tax
at H's death. If it is possible to make corporate distributions to S and D with
respect to their common stock without dividend treatment, this technique
is even more valuable.
The contemplated regulations presumably would prevent this result.41
DIFFICULT STATUTORY TERMS
Although the debate over estate freezes is ancient, the immediate germ of Sec-
tion 2036(c) is the following suggestion of congressional staffs:
The parent's estate could include the full value of property which is effec-
tively subject to the retained life interest (i.e., the common stock as well as
the preferred stock, in the recapitalization case ... )2
When the House Committee on Ways and Means acted upon this suggestion,
it was reported as follows:
If an owner of a substantial interest in an enterprise transfers a dispropor-
tionate share of the appreciation in the enterprise while retaining dispropor-
tionate control or income of that enterprise, the transferred interest would
be included in his gross estate.43
Most estate planners who were aware of these developments thought they
knew what these concepts were aimed at. But when these concepts, and very little
more, were arranged into paragraphs and subparagraphs and presented as a statute,
39Proposed I.R.C. § 2036(c)(6).
40 See supra note 37, at 426.
4 1 Like the rest of § 2036(c), this new provision would seem to operate only one way, adversely to clients.
For example, although it appears aimed at distributions to younger-generation owners, it is not at all clear
that it contemplates that the younger-generation owners' subsequent contributions to capital would be given
the reverse effect.
42 Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, Description of Possible Options to Increase Revenues 266 (June
25, 1987).
43 Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, Summary of Ways & Means Committee Action on October 13,
1987, at 22.
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no one knew what they meant anymore. Much of the astonishing breadth, as well
as the exasperating uncertainty, of Section 2036(c) can be analyzed by considering
the various concepts which, undefined or loosely defined, found themselves serv-
ing as statutory terms."4
"Substantial interest." As a threshold for the mechanics of IRC Section
2036(c) to be brought into play, the transferor and the transferor's family must
have owned a "substantial interest" in the enterprise.4 5 The parenthetical "directly
or indirectly" increases the reach of the threshold test by expanding what both
the transferor and the transferor's family are deemed to own. By design and in
operation, this provision is aimed at tiered entities.
Examples:
1. Wowns one percent of the voting common stock and two percent of the
nonvoting preferred stock of a corporation. All the rest of the stock of the
corporation is held by a trust created and funded by W's uncle in 1981. The
trust beneficiaries are D and S, and the trustee is X Bank. In 1988, W gives
her common stock to D and S. D and S, beneficiaries of the trust, are treated
as owning all the stock owned by the trust. Therefore, Wand her family, D
and S, are treated as owning all the stock of the corporation - clearly a
"substantial interest" - and the common stock given in 1988 is included in
W's gross estate.
This provision, however, operates only for purposes of the "substantial in-
terest" threshold test, not for purposes of determining a retained interest in the
enterprise. For example:
2. W owns all the common stock of a corporation. All the preferred stock
of the corporation is held by a trust created and funded by W's uncle in 1981.
The trust beneficiaries are D and S, and the trustee is XBank. In 1988 Wgives
the common stock to D and S. The preferred stock is treated as owned by
the trust beneficiaries, D and S. Although it would therefore be attributed
to W for purposes of the "substantial interest" threshold test, it is not at-
tributed to Was a retained interest in the corporation. Therefore, Whas re-
tained no interest in the corporation, and Section 2036(c) does not apply.
Although the above examples deal with a trust, the result would be the same
with respect to any pass-through entity. Thus, the interest in an enterprise owned
44Commentators have universally noted the great breadth and ambiguity of the statute. See, e.g., Belcher &
Wood, Section 2036(c): Has the Ice Age Arrivedfor Estate Freezes?, 13 ESTATES, GIFTS & TRUSTS J. 63
(1988); Bettigole, Use of Estate Freeze Severely Restricted by Revenue Act of'87, 68 J. TAX. 132 (1988); Blatt-
machr & Gans, Putting The Heat on Freezes, PROBATE & PROPERTY 12 (May/June 1988); Covey, U.S.
Trust-Practical Drafting, April 1988, at 1415; Foster & Rabun, Planning Strategies to Cope with the Limits
Imposed on Estate Freezes by RA '87, 15 ESTATE PLANNING 130 (1988); Keydel, The Internal Revenue
Code's New 'Anti-Freeze" Provision, 34 PRACTICAL LAWYER 11 (1988); Mahon, Poorly Conceived Statute
Is Bad for Business, TRUST & ESTATES 45 (May 1988); Treanor, The Revenue Act of 1987: Estate Valua-
tion Freeze, TAX MGT MEMORANDUM (1988).
45 1RC §§ 2036(c)(1)(A) and (3)(A).
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by a partnership would be attributed to the partners, and the interest in an enter-
prise owned by a corporation would be attributed to the shareholders. Such at-
tribution is applied successively in complex multi-tiered structures.
The 10% threshold test applies to the ownership of voting power, income
stream, or both.46 Here, "voting power" probably includes the right to vote stock
held in trust, as exercisable by a fiduciary or by holders of the voting trust cer-
tificates. 4 7 The reference to "income stream" conceivably may include interest
on debt, consultant's or director's fees, deferred compensation or retirement ar-
rangements, or even intrafamily royalties or rent. This may be largely academic,
however, because the interests of the whole family are aggregated for this pur-
pose anyway. The allocation of "income" or other rights among respective family
members is not important to the threshold "substantial interest" test.48
"Enterprise. " The term "enterprise" in Section 2036(c)(1)(A) is said to in-
clude "a business or other property which may produce income or gain." 49 A plain
language interpretation nets a meaning broad enough to include an investment
company, co-owned assets, and even unimproved real estate. But to interpret it
to include such assets as cash and marketable securities would simply render the
10% "substantial interest" test irrelevant.
"Holds." In Section 2036(c)(1)(A), the phrase "any person holds a substantial
interest" apparently contemplates the status quo before the transaction. To il-
lustrate: H owns 12% of all the stock, voting common and nonvoting preferred,
of a corporation. In 1988, H gives half the voting common stock to N. The stock
H retains represents less than 10% of the voting power and income stream of the
corporation. No other member of his family has any interest in the corporation.
Yet the stock H gives to N in 1988 is included in his gross estate, because H owned
a "substantial interest" in the corporation before making the gift. But if H gives
the balance of his common stock to N in 1990, then Section 2036(c) should not
apply, because H (together with his family) does not hold a substantial interest
in the corporation in 1990. Thus, the 1988 gift will be included in his gross estate,
but the 1990 gift should not be.
If, however, H had given all his common stock to N in 1988, it would then
all be included in H's gross estate. This result suggests both the opportunity for
advantages timing and the likelihood that step-transaction rules will be invoked
in some cases.50
461.R.C. § 2036(c)(3)(A).
47 Cf § 2036(b).
48 Compare discussion infra notes 59-62, where for purposes of § 2036(c)(1)(B) a broad interpretation of "in-
come" is by no means academic.
49 Conference Report, supra note 4, at 996.50Note that transfers two years apart are collapsed in Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-2(e)(4), Example (1).
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'After December 17, 1987" One would ordinarily not think that the phrase
"after December 17, 1987" was ambiguous. While its principal purpose is to
grandfather pre-December 18, 1987, freeze transactions, however, even this
reference in Section 2036(c)(1)(B) raises serious questions of interpretation in its
application to serial transfers.
Assume in each of the following examples that Wowns 80 percent of the com-
mon and preferred stock of a corporation:
1. Wgives D all her common stock. The common stock will, of course, be
included in her gross estate.
2. Alternatively, assume that in 1988 W gives S half her common stock
(40%). Then in 1990 she gives S half her remaining common stock (20%)
and half her preferred stock (40%). If the 1988 and 1990 gifts are each viewed.
in isolation, then 40% of the common stock (the subject of the 1988 gift) will
be included in W's gross estate. But no stock will be subject to Section
2036(c) by reason of the 1990 gift, because Wgave the same proportion of
each class of stock she owned. If the gifts are viewed in the aggregate,
however, W will have given S 60% of the corporation's common stock and
40% of the preferred stock, and only the difference - 20% of the common
stock - is subject to Section 2036(c).5'
3. Alternatively, assume that in 1988 Wgives half her preferred stock (40%)
to S. Presumably Section 2036(c) does not apply to a gift of only preferred
stock. Then in 1990 Wgives three-fourths of her common stock (60%) to S.
If the gifts are viewed in isolation, it appears that 60% of the common stock
is included in W's gross estate. But because this result is the same as in Ex-
ample 2, perhaps only 20% - or 40%? - should be included in her gross
estate. On the other hand, it might be argued that this result is not the same
as in Example 2, because W has postponed the "freeze" in this example and
thereby has arguably obtained less benefit from it. If so, it is hard to tell how
this factor should be quantified.52
"Disproportionately large." Despite the difficulties with other terms in the
statute, there is no question that the most troublesome terms in the new statute
are "disproportionately large" and "in effect." Under Section 2036(c)(1)(B), the
estate tax consequences of Section 2036(c) are triggered when a person with a
substantial interest in an enterprise in effect transfers after December 17, 1987,
property having a disproportionately large share of the potential appreciation in
51 The proposed "technical correction" of Section 2036(c)(4) apparently is intended to produce the latter result.
The accompanying staff description refers to a removal from Section 2036(c) of the "percent of the common
stock with respect to which proportionality was restored." Description, supra note 37 at 425. In the exam-
ple in the text, therefore, W would presumably be treated as making a gift of an additional 20% of the cor-
poration's common stock in 1990, and 20% of the corporation's common stock would be subject to Section
2036(c) upon her death. But the answer is by no means clear from the language of the proposed statute itself.
52It was perhaps too much to be hoped that the pending "technical correction" would shed any light on this
example, It does not. The answer may have to await further technical corrections, regulations, or even litigation.
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such person's interest in the enterprise while retaining a disproportionately large
share in the income of, or rights in, the enterprise.
The ink was barely dry on the President's signature when a great debate arose
whether Section 2036(c)(1)(B) contains two tests (one relating to "appreciation"
and another relating to "income" or "rights") orjust one test. Originally, it was
almost universally assumed among practitioners and commentators53 that there
are two tests, and that it is therefore possible by ingenious planning and drafting
to create estate freezes that fail one test but not both. One possibility might be
a gift by a parent to a child of participating or convertible voting preferred stock
with a cumulative dividend that exceeds the dividend on the conventional preferred
stock the parent retains.
But another question that arose very early about the term "disproportionately
large" is "Disproportionate to what?" One answer supplied by the context is that
the two "shares" of Section 2036(c)(1)(B) - the share of potential appreciation
and the share of income or rights - are compared to each other. So analyzed,
the second question provides the answer to the first: there is only one test, stated
two different ways. If one share "proportionately" goes down, the other share
must "proportionately" go up.5 4
The disproportionality test, then, is a matter of comparing ratios of ratios
- the ratio of an individual's interest in the potential appreciation of an enter-
prise to his or her total interest in the enterprise before the transfer, compared to
the same ratio recomputed after the transfer.
This comparison is easier to illustrate than to describe: For example: H, who
owns all the stock of a corporation, gives 49% of the common stock to D. He re-
tains a majority of the potential appreciation - 51%. Nevertheless, because he
began with 100% of the potential appreciation, he has reduced his share of poten-
tial appreciation - from 100% to 51%. Moreover, because he has not reduced
his share of preferred stock at all, he has reduced his share of potential appreciation
disproportionately. Thus, Section 2036(c) applies, and the transferred common
stock is included in his gross estate.55
53See, e.g., Belcher & Wood, supra note 44, at 65; Covey, supra note 44, at 1415.
54 Although the metaphor may be more intriguing than illuminating, the author has colloquially described
this phenomenon by pointing out that to be "less awake" is the same as to be "more asleep." Perhaps more
to the point, it is impossible to transfer a disproportionately large share of the frosting without retaining a
disproportionately large share of the cake.
55It could be argued that a transfer of potential appreciation is never "disproportionately large" if the transferor,
as in the example in the text, retains more potential appreciation than he transfers. See Covey, supra note 44,
at 1419. See generally Foster & Rabun, supra note 44, at 132. This argument derives its force from the state-
ment of managers in the conference report, which states: "A disproportionately large share of potential ap-
preciation is any share of appreciation in the enterprise greater than the share of appreciation borne by the
property retained by the transferor." Conference Report, supra note 4, at 996. It is difficult to see the policy
justification for such a rule; the transfer of a remainder interest in less than half of any property, for exam-
ple, has always been caught by § 2036(a). In any event, it is apparent that the conference report does not mean
what it appears to say in absolute terms, but must be applied in a comparative manner as illustrated in the
text. For example, the Ways and Means Committee report, commenting on language in the House bill that
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Using identical facts as above, except that H also gives D 48% of the prefer-
red stock, H has now substantially reduced his share in the income of, or rights
in, the corporation. Nevertheless, because even the substantially-reduced share
he retains is larger than the share of potential appreciation he retains, his retain-
ed share is "disproportionately large." Section 2036(c) applies, and 1% of the com-
mon stock is included in H's gross estate.
Another great debate has revolved around the application of Section 2036(c)
to voting and nonvoting stock for example, although not exclusively, in an S cor-
poration. Some commentators assumed early that Section 2036(c) should not ap-
ply to the transfer of nonvoting stock and the retention of otherwise identical voting
stock.56 Increasingly uneasy about the prospect that congressional staffs might
have intended the statute to apply to such a transfer, other commentators have con-
cluded that the answer is not clear 57 and that such a transfer might be caught.
58
Viewed as a matter of policy, there seems to be no reason to attempt to
distinguish between a block of nonvoting stock and a minority block of voting
stock. Viewed as a matter of statutory construction, however, it is possible to bring
voting and nonvoting stock within the range of Section 2036(c)(1)(B). Although
at first blush two classes of stock, one voting and one nonvoting but otherwise
identical, do not seem to present an opportunity to transfer "a disproportionate-
ly large share of the potential appreciation," this necessarily assumes that ap-
preciation is allocated proportionately to the control premium representated by
the right to vote. If appreciation is allocated less than proportionately to that con-
trol premium, then the conditions of Section 2036(c) appear to be satisfied.
Example: H owns all the 100 shares of voting common stock and all the 100
shares of nonvoting common stock of a corporation. The value of the cor-
poration is assumed to be $210,000, allocated $1,000 to each share of non-
voting stock and $1,100 to each share of voting stock. Assume that H gives
the nonvoting stock to D. Assume further that subsequently the corporation
roughly doubles in value, to $415,000, but the value of the right to vote in-
creases only 50%, from $100 to $150 per share. The $415,000 value of the
corporation is therefore allocated $2,000 to each share of nonvoting stock
and $2,150 to each share of voting stock. D's nonvoting stock has appreciated
100% (from $1,000 to $2,000 per share) while H's retained voting stock has
appreciated only 95.45% (from $1,100 to $2,150 per share). It is arguable that
H has transferred to D a disproportionately large share of the appreciation.
was not materially different on this point in the ultimate conference report, stated: "A disproportionate share
need not be substantially disproportionate within the meaning of § 302(b)(2)(C)." H.R. Rep. 100-391, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1044 (1987). In other words, a disproportionate share could be less than 20% of the transferor's
interest. Similarly, the staff description of the pending technical corrections bill liberally cites examples where
no more than half of the transferor's interest in potential appreciation is transferred. Description, supra note
37, at 424-25.
16 E.g., Bettigole, supra note 44, at 133.
-7E.g., Mahon, supra note 44, at 50.
5 8E.g., Belcher & Wood, supra note 44. at 68.
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In any event, when it is remembered that the word "disproportionately" invites
a comparison to the transferor's entire interest, including the right to vote, than
a "potential-appreciation-per-vote" analysis emerges, by which Section 2036(c)
might be found applicable, without regard for the control premium.
For example: Wowns all of the 100 shares of voting common stock and all
of the 100 shares of nonvoting common stock of a corporation. She gives D half
of her nonvoting common stock. She has given away one-fourth of the potential
appreciation, compared to none of the voting rights - a "disproportionately large
share of the potential appreciation." Put another way, she has retained 100% of
the voting rights, compared to only 75% of the appreciation potential - a
"disproportionately large share in the... [voting] rights," even if she retains only
75% of the income.
If there is a possibility that Section 2036(c) will be applied to voting and non-
voting stock, then considerable care must be taken in advising clients about any
arguable "transfer." Voting trusts, powers of attorney, and even pledges as security
for loans will be suspect. Further, every limited partnership may be deemed to
have voting (general) and nonvoting (limited) interests, and even a general part-
nership may have a "voting" managing partner.
The terms "income" and "rights" in Section 2036(c)(1)(B) are very broad,
perhaps even broad enough to include interest and compensation. For instance,
there may be no difference between debt and preferred stock-for purposes of Sec-
tion 2036(c). If so, then, interest on debt is within the scope of "income." To il-
lustrate: W owns common stock and corporate notes. She gives the stock to S.
Because of W's retention of the notes, the stock is included in W's gross estate. 9
The problem of interest and compensation might prove to be one of the most
important and controversial issues raised by Section 2036(c). While it is easy to
say that corporate notes are treated like corporate stock, an indiscriminate applica-
tion of Section 2036(c) to loans will lead to peculiar results. How would one ac-
count for a "loan" or other extension of credit arising in the ordinary course of
business, such as an open account? What about a loan to a child who is a
shareholder? Or a loan to a child even if there is no corporation? What about a
loan, or even an ordinary gift, to a child which the child uses to start or invest
in an unrelated business? How are such loan or gift proceeds traced?
As to a parent's services to a family enterprise, the receipt of compensation
might be the retention of an income interest, but the rendering of services without
compensation might itself be a taxable gift. It may be that if. W is employed by
the corporation, her salary must be cut in half if she is to give S half of her com-
mon stock without triggering Section 2036(c). (Even that might not work unless
59 See also the example involving corporate debt infra text accompanying note 66.
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her duties and authority are also cut in halt) 60 Deferred compensation and retire-
ment arrangements could create great complexity.6' Similar issues are presented
by compensation for the use of property, such as rent or royalties. It is hoped that
regulations take a reasonable approach to these issues.62
The "retaining" test is also very broad, making it difficult to measure the
effect of the transaction in many cases. Example: H gives all the common stock
of a corporation to S, retaining only one share of $100 preferred stock (or one $100
corporate note, if debt is treated like stock). It would make no sense to treat the
retention of a $100 interest as the "retention of the enjoyment" of the entire cor-
poration. But the statute gives no indication of how to draw a line in such cases.
The "disproportionately large" test is apparently intended to be applied at
the time of the transfer. Consistent with the statute's general one-way application,
there is no provision for a "look-back" and therefore no relief if the enterprise
declines in value. Section 2036(c) apparently applies even if it is expected from
the beginning that the enterprise will decline in value and it is desired for some
reason to shift that high risk of decline in value to younger-generation owners.63
"In effect." The words "in effect" are the coiled spring which could sud-
denly and unexpectedly project Section 2036(c) into so many business and non-
business circumstances and which therefore have caused the greatest apprehen-
sion about the statute. It is this term which applies Section 2036 to any transac-
tion or event which simulates a transfer of appreciable property, which achieves
the same result that a transfer of appreciable property would achieve, or which
when broken down into the tiniest of components could conceivably be
reconstituted in the form of a transfer of appreciable property. Whenever such
a transaction or event occurs, it will be necessary under the statute to test the
transferor's and transferee's shares of potential appreciation compared to their
shares of all income of and rights in the enterprise, before and after the transaction.
The transferor and transferee need not even both be parties to the "transfer"
for purposes of Section 2036(c), because transactions with the business entity
are analyzed for transfer tax purposes as if they are transactions among the owners
of the beneficial interest in the enterprise, proportionately.6 4 Thus, a redemption
is "in effect" a transfer, and Section 2036(c) applies. For example, H owns 75%
60 Under the general principles applicable to § 2036, however, the mere "right" to compensation would not
be regarded as "retained" at the time of the transfer unless there were a legal commitment or express or im-
plied understanding. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a);'United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 148-50 (1972).
61 This discussion is by no means exhaustive. As soon as one example is analyzed and the probable result
predicted, a half-dozen new examples emerge. § 2036(c) is broad enough to cover a host of transactions and
arrangements that would not otherwise appear to involve the capital structure of the enterprise.
62 There is no reason for § 2036(c) to deal with matters - such as the adequacy of interest or the reasonableness
of compensation - that are amply addressed by other provisions of the law.
63See Scenario Il in Appendix A, however, for an illustration of the computation when the value of the enter-
prise declines.
64 See Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(1).
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of the common and preferred stock of a corporation. S owns the other 25%. H
causes the corporation to redeem his common stock. The transfer to the corpora-
tion is treated as a transfer to S. Therefore, Section 2036(c) applies, even if the
redemption proceeds are full consideration. If there are no other transactions,
three-fourths of the value of S's common stock is included in H's gross estate. 5
Similarly, the issuance of stock by a corporation is "in effect" a transfer, and
Section 2036(c) applies. For example: H, who owns all the common and preferred
stock of a corporation, causes the corporation to issue common stock to S. Sec-
tion 2036(c) applies, even if S pays full consideration. S's common stock is in-
cluded in H's gross estate.
Clearly Section 2036(c) applies to ordinary corporate recapitalizations, which
"in effect" are combinations of redemptions and issuances of stock.
Examples:
1. H owns 75% of the single class of common stock of a corporation. S owns
the other 25%. H exchanges his stock for voting preferred stock in a tax-free
recapitalization. Because H entered the transaction owning 75% of the poten-
tial appreciation, 75% of the value of S's common stock is included in H's
gross estate.
2. H owns 75% of the single class of common stock of a corporation. S owns
the other 25%. H exchanges his stock for corporate notes. If debt is treated
the same as preferred stock 66 then 75% of the value of S's common stock is
included in H's gross estate.6 7
Although the examples immediately above deal with corporate transactions,
similar results would obtain with respect to changes in the interests in any enti-
ty, such as a partnership. 8
In contrast, Section 2036(c) apparently might not be applied to buy-sell agree-
ments. Although granting an option to buy may be viewed as a transfer of part
of the "bundle of property rights' 69 and Section 2036(c) reportedly was intended
by its drafters to apply to such a "transfer," its written legislative history suggests
that it is not aimed at issues that historically have been regarded as valuation
issues! o
Whether the creation of a new enterprise constitutes a "transfer" under Sec-
tion 2036(c) remains unclear, especially when the enterprise begins as a "joint"
6 5 This result is the same whether or not the redemption escapes dividend treatment under § 302(b). This could
be the result in the case of so-called "leveraged buyouts."
66See supra text accompanying note 59.
67This result is the same whether or not the exchange escapes dividend treatment under § 302(b).
6 8 Some have even suggested that the amendment of a partnership agreement merely to conform to the new
partnership allocation rules under Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b) could be construed as creating a transfer, in ef-
fect, of potential appreciation.
69 Dorn v. United States, 86-2 USTC P13,701 (W..D. Pa. 1986, rev'd, 828 F.2d 177 (3d Cir. 1987).
70 Conference Report, supra note 4, at 996.
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or "split" purchase of a life estate and a remainder. It can be argued that if there
is no "enterprise" for purposes of Section 2036(c)(1)(A) and no before-and-after
shares of potential appreciation to test for purposes of Section 2036(c)(1)(B), then
Section 2036(c) does not apply.
Examples:
1. W and D form a corporation with cash. W receives preferred stock and
D receives common stock. Section 2036(c) apparently does not apply.
2. Same as Example I except that D received her cash as a gift from W Sec-
tion 2036(c) may not apply.
3. W forms a corporation with cash and receives common and preferred
stock. She immediately gives (or sells) the common stock to D. Because in
substance this is the same as Example 1 (if a sale) or 2 (if a gift), the result
should be the same. Section 2036(c) should not apply. (But prudence would
dictate avoiding this form of transaction.)
Any line-drawing with Section 2036(c) is difficult, but these suggested results
regarding the creation of a new enterprise and a joint purchase are especially hard
to reconcile. It is probable that a joint purchase of a conventional life estate and
remainder will be covered by Section 2036(c), 7 but it is very hard in some cases
to distinguish such a joint purchase from the joint creation of a corporation which
issues preferred and common stock.
There are yet more unanswered questions. In Example 1 immediately above,
what if nonbusiness income-producing assets, such as passive rental real estate,
royalty interests, or Government securities, were contributed to the new corpora-
tion instead of cash. In Example 2, what if a loan were used instead of a gift? In
Example 3,.how long is "immediately?"
It is the judgment of this author that all these questions should be resolved
in favor of a finding that Section 2036(c) does not apply to the interests received
upon the creation of a new enterprise, because that transaction most resembles
a "gamble." 72 To the extent that there is a policy justification for a rule like Sec-
tion 2036(c), it seems to this author that it is limited to the freeze of an interest
in a going concern with proven appreciation potential.
Moving to a slightly different context, what would be the result if the enter-
prise underwent a change of form? In general, where there is a pre-existing enter-
prise and before-and-after shares to test, Section 2036(c) applies. For example,
an incorporation of a partnership or sole proprietorship is treated for this pur-
pose like a recapitalization, not like the creation of a new enterprise.
7 1 The example that is circulating among estate planners is 100 share of stock in a publicly-held corporation,
in which a father buys a life estate for cash and his child buys the remainder for cash. It is generally assum-
ed that § 2036(c) could catch such an arrangement, although it certainly stretches the conventional understan-
ding of the term "enterprise" to apply it to 100 shares of stock in a huge publicly-owned corporation.
72See supra text following note 14.
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Perhaps the most ironic phenomenon of all is that the "antifreeze" provisions
of Section 2036(c) could apply to an "unfreezing" transaction. For example: In
a pre-1987 recapitalization, H received all the preferred stock of a corporation and
S received all the common stock. Now the preferred stock dividend has become
a burden to the corporation, and H no longer needs it. But H might be deemed
to have made a gift to S if the dividend is not paid.73 H therefore converts his pre-
ferred stock back into common stock. If S predeceases H, Section 2036(c) might
apply.74
CONSEQUENCES OF SECTION 2036(c)
Appendix A presents an analysis of the total estate and gift tax liabilities under
various scenarios - comparing a gift, a sale, and no transfer at all, with and
without Section 2036(c).
There are also a number of indirect and incidental consequences of the ap-
plication of Section 2036(c). The includability of previously transferred property
in the transferor's estate under Section 2036(c) could increase the estate's eligibility
for stock redemption under Section 303, deferral of estate tax under Section 6166,
and possibly special-use valuation under Section 2032A. Such property would
receive a new in'come-tax basis at death equal to its estate tax value. 5 If the prop-
erty is then in the hands of a person more than one generation below the genera-
tion of the transferor, a generation-skipping transfer tax could be imposed. 76
The interplay with local law may present very difficult issues of tax appoint-
ment. State appointment statutes might not give the executor the right to pursue
the owners of non-probate assets included in the Federal gross estate but not the
probate estate.7 7 In any event, tax clauses in wills should be reconsidered, and
payment of the tax should be a planning objective.
WHAT'S LEFT? REMAINING FREEZE TACTICS
Any article on Section 2036(c) should have a section entitled "What's Left?"
But this section might most honestly be left blank. The language of Section
2036(c) is so broad that it is almost impossible to cite any example to which it
certainly will not be applied.
73 Technical Advice Memoranda 8403010 and 8723007. See also Technical Advice Memorandum 8726005.
74 But since there was no "transfer of property" from S to H (only possibly a deemed transfer "in effect"),
the ultimate irony is that the credit for tax on prior transfers under § 2013 might not be available when H subse-
quently dies. Note that all the other examples presented in this article presuppose transfers (or deemed transfers
"in effect") from an older generation to a younger generation. It is hazardous to approach § 2036(c) with
any presuppositions whatsoever.
75I.R.C. § 1014(b)(9).
76 Under proposed § 2642(0, which would be added by Section 114(g)(5) of the pending technical correc-
tions bill (H.R. 4333 and S. 2238), the allocation of the generation-skipping transfer tax inclusion ratio would
be suspended until death in a case to which Section 2036(c) applies.
77 Even transferee liability under § 6901 would be problematic in the case of a deemed transfer "in effect."
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One possibility is that any entity freeze may continue to be effective, if the
frozen interest is automatically extinguished, shifted, or converted to a growth
interest before death. An example might be a so-called "GRIT preferred interest"
such as preferred stock which freezes an estate, but which is automatically con-
verted after a term of years or the occurrence of a specified event to common stock,
thereby "unfreezing" the estate. 8 Such interests take their names from the so-
called grantor retained income trust, which they resemble. For that matter, any
grantor retained income trust should continue to escape Section 2036(c), 79
although, of course, it will be caught by Section 2036(a) if the grantor dies within
the term. If the grantor survives the term of years, Section 2036(a), as expand-
ed by Section 2036(c)(1), might not apply. In addition, even Section 2036(c)(4)
(either as originally enacted or as the proposed technical correction would amend
it) might not apply, because it requires a "transfer" and is not modified by the
expansive "in effect" language of Section 2036(c)(1)(B). This interpretation, of
course, cannot be guaranteed. Moreover, any GRIT arrangement is obviously not
a totally reliable estate planning device, because survival for the necessary period
can never be assured.
A "capital shift" partnership freeze might still be available. For example: W
owns a conventional partnership interest. D owns a "preferred" partnership in-
terest with a right to a very large return on capital, say 20%, payable only from
net income but cumulative to the extent not paid. The partnership cumulative
obligation to D with respect to her preferred interest dilutes the value of W's in-
terest. W's estate would argue that Section 2036(c) does not apply, because Wre-
tained the "residual" appreciation potential. On the other hand, the IRS would
be expected to argue that Section 2036(c) should be applied to such an arrange-
ment on a facts-and-circumstances or substance-over-form theory.
The possibility that the joint creation of a "new enterprise" might not be cov-
ered by Section 2036(c) has already been discussed. 0 In addition, a post mortem
joint purchase freeze, wherein a marital trust buys a life estate or term of years
and a credit shelter trust buys a remainder in assets not previously owned by either,
might continue to be effective, because the identity of the transferor and transferee
are less clear. Indeed, if the marital trust is a QTIP trust, it is conceivable that
the marital trust and credit shelter trust would have exactly the same terms and
beneficiaries. In any joint purchase, a term of years might be better than a life.
estate, to strengthen the case if the elder purchaser survives the term, as in a GRIT.
7 8If § 2036(c) is interpreted to apply to debt instruments, then the simplest example of a GRIT-type interest
might be an installment sale note. Another important GRIT-type arrangement is a fixed-term partnership.
79See Bettigole, supra note 44, at 134; Blattmachr & Wood, supra note 44, at 17; covey, supra note 44, at
1430-32; Foster & Rabun, supra note 44, at 133. The "transfer" occurs when the GRIT is created. Letter
Rulings 8815005 & 8805029. But see Belcher & Wood, supra note 44, at 69 (suggesting that a GRIT is caught
by Section 2036(c) unless the grantor survives the termination of the GRIT by three years).
80See supra text following note 70.
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Buy-sell agreements might escape Section 2036(c), but such an agreement
will still fail if it is "a device to pass the decedent's shares to the natural objects
of his bounty for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth." 81
A Dean-Hartzell type recapitalization might still work, if notes are used in-
stead of preferred stock, if the notes are kept as clean (of equity features) and short-
term as possible, and if section 2036(c) is interpreted not to apply to debt. In any
event, substantial appreciation can still be removed from the estate by transfer-
ring interests in an enterprise with only one class of ownership, or a proportional
share of all classes of ownership held by the transferor.
Finally, no estate freeze technique should be categorically discarded. If there
are business or other non-tax reasons for the freeze transaction, the freeze should
be considered. To the extent that Section 2036(c) is interpreted to merely
reproduce the tax result that would have obtained if no initial transfer had been
made, then there might be little or no downside tax risk in the transaction. 82
CONCLUSION
Section 2036(c) is very broad. No significant adjustment in the relationships
of the owners of an enterprise should be undertaken without considering its possi-
ble reach. Although Section 2036(c) serves a questionable need, it probably will
not be repealed .83 Moreover, it appears very difficult to draft appropriate language
that would limit Section 2036(c) to a reasonable scope. For that reason, the best
development in the interpretation of Section 2036(c) would be the prompt issuance
of regulations or similar guidance with lots of examples - examples both of the
extreme cases, so the public will understand the principles involved, and of the
borderline cases, so the public will understand where lines are to be drawn.
81 Reg. § 20.2031-2(h). See Dom v. United States, 828 F.2d 177 (3d Cir. 1987). Cf Technical Advice Memoran-
dum 8710004 (stock redemption agreement).
82 See Appendix A.
83 Some practitioners have suggested that § 2036(c) might be replaced by additional disclosure requirements,
beefed-up undervaluation penalties, and extended statutes of limitations. This author has reservations about
relying on such mechanisms. Valuation of a closely-held business is necessarily an extremely subjective matter,
and the reopening of valuation questions years after transactions have been completed could work tremen-
dous mischief.
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APPENDIX A
COMPUTATIONS
Assumptions:
1. In 1993 H owns, or receives in a recapitalization, all the common stock
of a corporation, valued at $1,000,000, and all the preferred stock of the
corporation, valued at $1,000,000 and paying an annual dividend of
$100,000. (The 10% yield is consistent with the current valuation tables
in Reg. § 20.2031-7.) H's after-tax income from these dividends is $70,000.
2. H gives (in Examples A and B) or sells (in Examples C, D, and E) his com-
mon stock to D and S in 1993. (He does nothing in Example F) Income
tax on the sale is disregarded.
3. All H's cash compounds at a rate of 10% annually.
4. H dies in 2003, having made no other gifts (or sales of stock).
5. At the time of his death, H owns other property with a value of $1,000,000.
6. I.R.C. § 2036(c) is taken into account in Examples A, C, and D, but for
comparison purposes is assumed not to have been enacted in Examples
B and E. (It is irrelevant in Example F.)
7. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(5) is interpreted to provide an offset for consideration
without compounding (like § 2043(a)) in Example C and an offset for con-
sideration compounded at 10% annually in Example D.
8. There are no material changes in the law.
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SCENARIO I
Common Stock Appreciates 20% Annually
1993 Transfer
§ 2036(c) Applies?
Compounding under § 2036(c)(5)?
a) Common Stock
b) § 2036(c)(5) Adjustment
c) Preferred Stock
d) Preferred Dividends,
Compounded
e) Less $153,000 Gift Tax,
Compounded
f) $1,000,000 Sale Proceeds
Compounded
g) Other Property
h) H's Gross Estate
i) Adjusted Taxable Gifts
j) Total
k) Tentative Tax
1) Less Gift Tax
m) Estate Tax
n) Less Unified Credit
o) Total Federal and State
(Soak-up) Estate Taxes
p) Add Back Gift Tax,
Compounded
q) Total Taxes, Compounded
6,191,736
1,000,000 1,000,000
6,191,736
-1,000,000
1,000,000
6,191,736
-2,593,742
1,000,000
1,115,620 1,115,620 1,115,620 1,115,620
-396,843 -396,843
1,000,000
8,910,513
8,910,513
4,23.1,057
-153,000
4,078,057
-192,800
1,000,000
2,718,777
1,000,000
3,718,777
1,635,189
-153,000
1,482,189
-192,800
2,593,742
1,000,000
10,901,098
10,901,098
5,271,404
5,271,404
-192,800
2,593,742
1,000,000
9,307,356
9,307,356
4,429,478
6,191,736
1,000,000 1,000,000
1,115,620 1,115,620
2,593,742
1,000,000 1,000,000
5,709,362 9,307,356
5,709,362
2,630,481
9,307,356
4,429,478
4,429,478 2,630,481 4,429,478
-192,800 -192,800 -192,800
3,885,257 1,289,389 5,078,604 4,236,678 2,437,681 4,236,678
396,843 396,843
4,282,100 1,686,232 5,078,604 4,236,678 2,437,681 4,236,678
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SCENARIO II
Common Stock Appreciates 10% Annually
1993 Transfer
§ 2036(c) Applies?
Compounding under § 2036(c)(5)?
a) Common Stock
b) § 2036(c)(5) Adjustment
c) Preferred Stock
d) Preferred Dividends,
Compounded
e) Less $153,000 Gift Tax,
Compounded
f) $1,000,000 Sale Proceeds
Compounded
g) Other Property
h) H's Gross Estate
i) Adjusted Taxable Gifts
j) Total
k) Tentative Tax
I) Less Gift Tax
m) Estate Tax
n) Less Unified Credit
o) Total Federal and State
(Soak-up) Estate Taxes
p) Add Back Gift Tax,
Compounded
q) Total Taxes, Compounded
2,593,742 2,593,742
-1,000,000
1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
2,593,742
-2,593,742
1,000,000
1,115,620 1,115,620 1,115,620 1,115,620
-396,843 -396,843
1,000,000
5,312,519
5,312,519
2,432,060
-153,000
2,279,060
-192,800
1,000,000
2,718,777
1,000,000
3,718,777
1,635,189
-153,000
1,482,189
-192,800
2,593,742
1,000,000
7,303,104
7,303,104
3,427,352
2,593,742
1,000,000
5,709,362
5,709,362
2,630,481
2,593,742
1,000,000 1,000,000
1,115,620 1,115,620
2,593,742
1,000,000 1,000,000
5,709,362 5,709,362
5,709,362
2,630,481
5,709,362
2,630,481
3,427,352 2,630,481 2,630,481 2,630,481
-192,800 -192,800 -192,800 -192,800
2,086,260 1,289,389 3,234,552 2,437,681 2,437,681 2,437,681
396,843
2,483,103
396,843
1,686,232 3,234,552 2,437,681 2,437,681 2,437,681
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SCENARIO III
Common Stock Declines in Value 10% Annually
1993 Transfer
§ 2036(c) Applies?
Compounding under § 2036(c)(5)?
a) Common Stock
b) § 2036(c)(5) Adjustment
c) Preferred Stock
d) Preferred Dividends,
Compounded
e) Less $153,000 Gift Tax,
Compounded
) $1,000,000 Sale Proceeds
Compounded
g) Other Property
h) H's Gross Estate
i) Adjusted Taxable Gifts
j) Total
k) Tentative Tax
1) Less Gift Tax
m) Estate Tax
n) Less Unified Credit
o) Total Federal and State
(Soak-up) Estate Taxes
p) Add Back Gift Tax,
Compounded
q) Total Taxes, Compounded
348,678 348,678 348,678
-1,000,000 -2,593,742
1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
1,115,620 1,115,620 1,115,620 1,115,620
-396,843 -396,843
1,000,000
3,067,455
3,067,455
1,309,528
-153,000
1,156,528
-192,800
2,593,742 2,593,742
1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
2,718,777 5,058,040 3,464,298
1,000,000
3,718,777 5,058,040. 3,464,298
1,635,189 2,304,820 1,507,949
-153,000
1,482,189 2,304,820 1,507,949
-192,800 -192,800 -192,800
348,678
1,000,000 1,000,000
1,115,620 1,115,620
2,593,742
1,000,000 1,000,000
5,709,362 3,464,298
5,709,362
2,630,481
3,464,298
1,507,949
2,630,481 1,507,949
-192,800 -192,800
963,728 1,289,389 2,112,020 1,315,149 2,437,681 1,315,149
396,843
1,686,232 2,112,020 1,315,149 2,437,681 1,315,149
396,843
1,360,571
26
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 5 [1988], Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol5/iss1/1
